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LEGISLATIVE PRAYER: HISTORICAL TRADITION
AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES
Chad West*
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment provides that “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”1 There is a great
deal of confusion among scholars, lower federal courts, and the Justices of the
Supreme Court over appropriate Establishment Clause principles,2 but it is at least
clear that the government “may not coerce anyone to support or participate in
religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which establishes a state religion
or religious faith, or tends to do so.”3 It has long been settled that state and local
legislative bodies may, in harmony with the Establishment Clause, open meetings
with prayers given by state-employed or volunteer clergy.4 Less clear is whether
legislators themselves may (1) offer prayers in local government meetings, and (2)
restrict the opportunity to give prayers to themselves. This Note reviews the history
of legislative prayer in the United States and the Supreme Court’s decisions about
clergy-led prayer practices, provides an overview of the current circuit-split on the
issue of legislator-led prayer, argues that legislator-led prayer cannot be upheld
under the same analysis used to allow clergy-led prayer, and proposes options for
resolving the split.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE PRAYER IN THE UNITED STATES
The “first American legislative prayer” was offered at the first Continental
Congress in 1774 by Reverend Jacob Duché, an Anglican minister from
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.5 The Continental Congress invited him to pray over the
objection of John Jay and John Rutledge, who thought that the delegates were “so
divided in religious Sentiments . . . that [they] could not join in the same Act of
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1
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2
See, e.g., Eric J. Segall, Mired in the Marsh: Legislative Prayer, Moments of Silence,
and the Establishment Clause, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 713, 724 (2009); Rowan Cty. v. Lund,
138 S. Ct. 2564, 2564 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“This Court’s
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in disarray.”).
3
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
4
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786–91 (1983); see also Town of Greece v.
Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 569–70 (2014).
5
Christopher C. Lund, The Congressional Chaplaincies, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
1171, 1177 (2009).
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Worship.”6 John Adams noted that the prayer had a profound positive effect on all
of the delegates.7 Duché and other chaplains offered prayers for the Continental
Congress until the Constitutional Convention of 1787.8 The Constitutional
Convention was starkly different from the Continental Congress with respect to
legislative prayer.9 Despite Benjamin Franklin’s insistence that chaplain-led prayer
would guide the Framers as they fashioned a new system of government, there is no
record of any prayers being offered at the Convention.10
The First United States Congress, “as one of its early items of business, adopted
the policy of selecting a chaplain to open each session with prayer.”11 Soon after,
the House12 and Senate13 elected chaplains. Because there is no record of the vote
for the creation of chaplaincies, it is difficult to determine how much consensus
existed within Congress about legislative prayer and congressional chaplaincies, but
it is clear that there was at least some disagreement about the matter.14 Despite
opposition from various groups,15 legislative prayer in Congress has continued
uninterrupted until today.16 On the state level, many legislatures have long traditions
of legislative prayer.17 In state legislatures there is wide variation on who offers
opening prayers, but “[i]n many chambers, it is a tradition for a chaplain to be
selected to serve the body.”18
6
Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams, 16 September 1774, NAT’L ARCHIVES,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/04-01-02-0101 [https://perma.cc/4T9DHXDH].
7
Id.
8
Lund, supra note 5, at 1182–83.
9
Id. at 1183.
10
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 450–52 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911); Lund, supra note 5, at 1183.
11
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787–88 (1983); see also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 18
(1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
12
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 788.
13
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 24 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
14
Lund, supra note 5, at 1184–85 (noting that some votes were cast to protest the
election of chaplains and that James Madison never gave outright approval to congressional
chaplaincies); see discussion infra Section IV.A.2.
15
See Lund, supra note 5, at 1196–1202 (explaining that, because of outside pressures,
Congress briefly suspended their regular chaplaincies in the 1850s and instead invited local
ministers to pray before congressional proceedings).
16
See id. at 1213; see also Reverend Patrick J. Conroy, S.J., OFF. CHAPLAIN: U.S.
HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES (Jan. 31, 2019), https://chaplain.house.gov/archive/index.html?id
=2854 [https://perma.cc/U48Z-SCQJ] (archiving a recent prayer given in the U.S. House of
Representatives); Jill Colvin et al., Longest Shutdown Over: Trump Signs Bill to Reopen
Government, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/30769167ab7a4
ef9adf880d020b775dd [https://perma.cc/U6Q7-VTLF] (“[A]s the Senate opened with
prayer, Chaplain Barry Black called on high powers . . . to help senators do ‘what is right.’”).
17
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, INSIDE THE L EGISLATIVE PROCESS 5145 (2002), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/legismgt/ILP/02Tab5Pt7.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8B54-JF5S].
18
Id. at 5-147.
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II. GUIDANCE FROM THE SUPREME COURT ON LEGISLATIVE PRAYER
With this brief history in mind, and taking into account the importance of
religion to many United States citizens, it is somewhat surprising that the Supreme
Court did not rule on a case challenging a legislative prayer practice on
Establishment Clause grounds until Marsh v. Chambers in 1983.19
A. Marsh v. Chambers – 1983
Ernest Chambers brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
Nebraska’s practice of opening each legislative day with a prayer was
unconstitutional as a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.20 A chaplain, chosen biennially by a state government body, offered
prayers each day that the legislature was in session and was paid using public
funds.21 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger framed the issue in Marsh as
“whether the Nebraska Legislature’s practice of opening each legislative day with a
prayer by a chaplain paid by the State violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.”22 The Court upheld the Nebraska practice, reasoning that the practice
of legislative prayer “is deeply embedded in the history and traditions of this
country.”23 Chief Justice Burger further explained that, absent an indication that
legislative prayers were being used “to proselytize or advance any one, or to
disparage any other, faith or belief,” the content of specific prayers is not of concern
to judges.24 Ultimately, the Court reasoned that, given “[t]he unbroken practice” of
legislative prayer in the United States for over two centuries, the practice was not a
violation of the Establishment Clause.25
In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that legislative prayer violated the core
Establishment Clause principle that “[g]overnment in our democracy, state and
national, must be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice.”26 As
Justice Brennan explained, this neutrality principle helps assure that religious issues
do not serve as a basis for choosing sides in the political arena.27 When the
government “declare[s] or act[s] upon some ‘official’ or ‘authorized’ point of view
on a matter of religion” citizens may feel alienated and cut off from the political

19

Scott W. Gaylord, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Marsh and Sectarian
Legislative Prayer Post-Summum, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1017, 1022 (2011).
20
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784–85 (1983).
21
Id.
22
Id. at 784.
23
Id. at 786.
24
Id. at 794–95.
25
Id. at 795.
26
Id. at 808 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103–
04 (1968)).
27
Id. at 805.
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processes of their own government.28 Perhaps most importantly, Justice Brennan
noted that the Court, by using a historical tradition analysis, sidestepped all of the
traditional Establishment Clause tests that were in use at the time and “carv[ed] out
an exception to the Establishment Clause . . . .”29
1. Traditional Establishment Clause Analysis and the Marsh Carve-Out
If one were to read the Marsh majority opinion without any knowledge of the
Supreme Court’s previous Establishment Clause jurisprudence, it would be entirely
reasonable to conclude that all Establishment Clause issues are analyzed using a
historical tradition analysis. The Marsh majority mentions the Lemon test,30 “[t]he
most commonly cited formulation of prevailing Establishment Clause doctrine”31 of
the day, only once.32 The majority’s brief mention of this landmark decision was
simply to note that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had applied the Lemon test
and found that Nebraska’s chaplaincy practice violated the Establishment Clause.33
The Marsh majority completely failed to reference Larson v. Valente,34 in which the
Supreme Court formulated another Establishment Clause test, used to evaluate “state
program[s] that discriminate[] among religious faiths, and not merely in favor of all
religious faiths . . . .”35 Much has been written about these and other Establishment
Clause tests,36 so no space will be dedicated to discussing them here, but it is clear
that Marsh need not have been decided by using historical tradition.37 Other avenues
of Establishment Clause analysis were well-established.38 Significantly, Justice

28

Id. at 805–06.
Id. at 796.
30
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (stating that, to be consistent with
the Establishment Clause, a government action must meet the following criteria: it must have
a “secular legislative purpose”; its “principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion”; and it must not “foster an excessive entanglement with
religion”).
31
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
32
Id. at 786 (majority opinion).
33
Id.
34
456 U.S. 228 (1982).
35
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 801 n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Larson, 456 U.S. at 246
(“[W]hen [courts] are presented with a state law granting a denominational preference, [they
must] treat the law as suspect and . . . apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its constitutionality.”).
36
See, e.g., Russell W. Galloway, Basic Establishment Clause Analysis, 29 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 845, 850–62 (1989) (outlining the primary Establishment Clause tests that
were in use around the time Marsh was decided).
37
See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796–801 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Court
could have used settled Establishment Clause tests and applying the Lemon test to the facts
of Marsh).
38
See Galloway, supra note 36, at 851.
29
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Brennan determined that Nebraska’s practice would violate the Establishment
Clause under Lemon39 and Larson.40
B. Town of Greece v. Galloway – 2014
The Supreme Court revisited the issue of legislative prayer in Town of Greece.41
In 1999, Greece, a town in upstate New York, began starting its monthly town board
meetings with a prayer offered by local clergymen.42 To find clergy to give prayers,
a town employee called local congregations listed in a town directory until she found
someone willing to pray at the board meeting.43 The town never denied any minister
the opportunity to pray at a town meeting, but because the vast majority of
congregations in Greece were Christian, the prayers offered to open meetings often
invoked Christian themes.44 After Susan Galloway, who attended town board
meetings to discuss local issues, “complained that Christian themes pervaded the
prayers,” the town invited clergy from two other faith groups to deliver prayers.45
Galloway eventually filed suit, claiming that the town’s prayer practice violated the
Establishment Clause because it sponsored Christian prayers to the exclusion of
other faiths.46
Applying Marsh, the Supreme Court held that the Greece’s practice was not in
violation of the Establishment Clause because it comported with the historical
tradition of legislative prayer in the United States.47 The Court determined that the
tradition reflected in Marsh permits chaplains to give prayers as they see fit and that
sectarian references do not remove prayers from that tradition.48 The Town of Greece
majority thus confirmed that “a challenge based solely on the content of a prayer
will not likely establish a constitutional violation” unless, over time, prayers
“denigrate [nonbelievers], proselytize, or betray an impermissible government
purpose.”49 The plaintiff in Town of Greece also challenged the town’s prayer
practice because it coerced participation by non-Christians and others who may not
have wanted to participate in a prayer ritual.50 The Court did not produce a majority
holding on the coercion issue and there has been some disagreement about which
39

Marsh, 463 U.S. at 800–01 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I have no doubt that, if any
group of law students were asked to apply the principles of Lemon to the question of
legislative prayer, they would nearly unanimously find the practice to be unconstitutional.”).
40
Id. at 801 n.11 (“I have little doubt that the Nebraska practice . . . would fail the
Larson test.”).
41
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 569–70 (2014).
42
Id. at 570–71.
43
Id. at 571.
44
Id. at 571–72.
45
Id. at 572.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 591–92.
48
Id. at 582–83.
49
Id. at 585.
50
Id. at 586.
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opinion controls.51 Justice Kennedy determined that Greece’s prayer practice was
not coercive, but stated that “[t]he analysis would be different if the town board
members directed the public to participate in the prayers, singled out dissidents for
opprobrium,52 or indicated that their decisions might be influenced by a person’s
acquiescence in the prayer opportunity.”53 Justice Thomas disagreed, indicating that,
“to the extent that coercion is relevant to the Establishment Clause analysis, it is
actual legal coercion that counts . . . .”54
In dissent, Justice Kagan argued that in the United States, “when a citizen
stands before her government, whether to perform a service or request a benefit, her
religious beliefs do not enter the picture.”55 In Justice Kagan’s view, a town board
meeting is different from a meeting of the federal Congress or a state legislature,
taking it outside of what Marsh recognized as appropriate.56 In town board meetings,
ordinary citizens have an opportunity to engage with town leaders in an intimate
setting and petition for town action that could directly affect their day-to-day lives.57
This is usually not the case in Congress and state assemblies.58 Justice Kagan
reasoned that prayers in such an intimate setting are very different from the tradition
outlined in Marsh and could lead some citizens to stop engaging with the local
democratic process.59
III. THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT ON LEGISLATOR-LED PRAYER
Marsh and Town of Greece addressed the issue of clergy-led prayer in state
legislatures and town board meetings.60 Lower federal courts have applied the

51
Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 515 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (“In our
panel opinion, we were divided regarding whether Justice Kennedy’s three-Justice plurality
opinion or Justice Thomas’s two-Justice concurring opinion controls . . . on the question of
coercion.”).
52
“Public disgrace or ill fame that follows from conduct considered grossly wrong or
vicious.” Opprobrium, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (9th ed. 1986).
53
Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 588 (plurality opinion).
54
Id. at 610 (Thomas, J., concurring).
55
Id. at 621 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing THOMAS JEFFERSON, VIRGINIA ACT FOR
ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Oct. 31, 1785), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION 85 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds., 1987)).
56
Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 622–24 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
See id. at 630–31 (giving the hypothetical example of a Muslim citizen petitioning a
town board and having to make a choice between joining in a prayer practice she does not
believe in or not participating and possibly offending the board members that she will soon
be attempting to persuade).
60
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784 (1983) (presenting the issue in the case as
whether a “practice of opening each legislative day with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the
State violates the Establishment Clause . . . .”); Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577.
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standards from these cases, coming to mixed results.61 The issue now making its way
through the federal court system is whether the identity of the prayer-giver is
relevant to the constitutionality of legislative prayer practices.62 For the remainder
of this Note, practices that involve prayers in government meetings given by anyone
other than a legislator or local commissioner will be referred to as “clergy-led
prayer” and prayer that is offered by government leaders will be called “legislatorled prayer” or “lawmaker-led prayer.”
A. Lund v. Rowan County, North Carolina – 2017
In Lund, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided “whether Rowan
County’s practice of lawmaker-led sectarian prayer r[an] afoul of the Establishment
Clause.”63 Rowan County is governed by an elected board of commissioners.64
During bi-monthly board meetings, the Rowan County commissioners sit at the front
of the room facing county residents.65 Each board meeting starts with one of the
commissioners saying “[l]et us pray,” or a similar phrase, followed by a prayer
offered by a board member.66 The board members take turns offering prayers on a
rotation system and “[n]o one outside the board is permitted to offer an
invocation.”67 Board meetings are recorded, and an examination of the years for
which recordings are available reveals that 97% of the board’s prayers used the
words “Jesus,” “Christ,” or “Savior.”68 The plaintiffs in Lund, none of whom are
Christian, actively participated in board meetings to speak about education issues.69
They brought suit, alleging that the prayer practice “advanced Christianity and
coerced [them] into participating in religious exercises.”70
In holding that Rowan County’s prayer practice violated the Establishment
Clause, the majority in Lund focused on four factors: “commissioners as the sole
prayer-givers;71 invocations that drew exclusively on Christianity and sometimes

61

Compare Coleman v. Hamilton Cty., 104 F. Supp. 3d 877, 888–90 (E.D. Tenn. 2015)
(concluding that a county’s clergy-led prayer practice did not violate the Establishment
Clause), with Hudson v. Pittsylvania Cty., 107 F. Supp. 3d 524, 536 (W.D. Va. 2015)
(concluding that a board’s prayer practice violated the Establishment Clause because it was
unconstitutionally coercive).
62
Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 537 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Lund v.
Rowan Cty., 863 F.3d 268, 280 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
63
Lund, 268 F.3d at 271–72.
64
Id. at 272.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 273.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 273–74.
71
Id. at 273–74, 281 (“By arrogating the prayer opportunity to itself, the Board . . .
restricted the number of faiths that could be referenced at its meetings.”).
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served to advance that faith;72 invitations to attendees to participate;73 and the local
government setting.”74 The Fourth Circuit noted that legislator-led prayer could take
place without creating an Establishment Clause violation,75 but that the combination
of the abovementioned factors “blur[red] the line between church and state” in a way
not contemplated by Town of Greece.76
The dissenting judges in Lund noted that, of the four factors outlined by the
majority, only the identity of the prayer-giver was distinguishable from Town of
Greece. 77 Noting that Town of Greece made no mention of a requirement for outside
clergy to give legislative prayers, the dissent claimed that “[p]ractically speaking,
the public is unlikely to draw any meaningful distinction between a state-paid
chaplain (Marsh) or state-invited cleric (Town of Greece) and members of the
legislative body that appoints him.”78 The dissent also relied on historical tradition
to support legislator-led prayer.79 The South Carolina Provincial Congress, South
Carolina’s first self-sustaining legislature, regularly allowed its elected members to
give opening prayers as early as 1775.80 In addition, the dissent noted the
contemporary prevalence of legislator-led prayer in state and federal government
meetings.81 In short, the dissent declared that Rowan County’s prayer practice was
largely indistinguishable from what the Supreme Court dealt with in Town of
Greece. 82 The four factors relied upon by the majority were each constitutional
standing alone and did not combine to create an Establishment Clause violation.83

72

Id. at 281, 284–85 (“Not only did the Board’s invocations convey its singular
approval of Christianity, the prayer opportunity on occasion served to advance that faith . . .
by characteriz[ing] Christianity as the one and only way to salvation . . . .”).
73
Id. at 281, 287 (“[W]hen [phrases like ‘Let us pray’] are uttered by elected
representatives acting in their official capacity, they become a request on behalf of the
state.”).
74
Id. at 281, 287 (“Relative to sessions of Congress and state legislatures, the intimate
setting of a municipal board meeting presents a heightened potential for coercion. Local
governments possess the power to directly influence both individual and community
interests.”).
75
Id. at 290.
76
Id. at 281 (quoting Lund v. Rowan Cty., 837 F.3d 407, 435 (4th Cir. 2016)
(Wilkinson, J., dissenting)).
77
Id. at 306 (Agee, J., dissenting).
78
Id. at 308.
79
See id. at 308.
80
Id. at 309.
81
Id. (noting that a majority of states allow individual legislators to give invocations
when they request to do so and that United States senators have occasionally delivered
prayers in meetings of Congress).
82
Id. at 306.
83
Id.
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B. Bormuth v. County of Jackson – 2017
In Bormuth, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that a county’s
legislator-led prayer practice did not violate the Establishment Clause.84 Jackson
County, Michigan is governed by an elected board of nine commissioners.85 To start
monthly board meetings, a commissioner typically asks that the other
commissioners and the members of the public in attendance “rise and assume a
reverent position.”86 One of the nine commissioners then says a prayer that is
“generally Christian in tone . . . .”87 The Plaintiff, a Pagan and Animist, first vocally
objected to the prayer practice during the public comment portion of a board
meeting.88 While he was commenting about the prayers, “one of the Commissioners
‘swiveled his chair and turned his back to [the plaintiff.]’”89 There was a dispute on
appeal as to whether certain video evidence of the board meetings could be
considered.90 One video shows a county commissioner calling Bormuth a “nitwit”
for speaking out against the prayer practice.91 Other commissioners categorized
Bormuth’s comments as an attack on “my lord and savior Jesus Christ,”92 and “an
attack on Christianity and Jesus Christ, period.”93 The majority did not consider the
video evidence because Bormuth’s complaint only referenced the videos’ general
availability and did not direct the district court to the specific portions on which
Bormuth was relying.94 The dissent argued that Bormuth drew the district court’s
attention to the videos, and even if he did not do so correctly, the Federal Rules of
Evidence required the court of appeals to take judicial notice of them.95
Relying on many of the same pieces of historical evidence as the dissenting
justices in Lund, the Bormuth majority determined that the board’s prayer practice
fit within the historical tradition of legislative prayer as outlined in Marsh and Town
of Greece.96 The majority also relied on the proposition that legislative prayer exists
“largely to accommodate the spiritual needs of lawmakers and connect them to a
84

Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 498 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 498–99.
89
Id. at 499.
90
Id. at 499–501.
91
Id. at 525 (Moore, J., dissenting); Cty. of Jackson, Personnel & Finance Committee
November 12, 2013 Jackson County, MI, YOUTUBE 43:29–43:40 (Dec. 19, 2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yOOClwZpaXc [https://perma.cc/S3NP-EHFK].
92
Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 525 (Moore, J., dissenting).
93
Id.; Cty. of Jackson, supra note 91, at 32:50–32:59.
94
Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 500.
95
Id. at 530–31 (Moore, J., dissenting); see also FED. R. EVID. 201(b), (c) (noting that
courts must take judicial notice of “a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute . . . if a
party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary information”).
96
Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 509–10 (referring to legislator-led prayer in the South Carolina
legislature in 1775).
85
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tradition dating to the time of the Framers.”97 Preventing legislators from giving
prayers detracts from their ability to show what they believe in and set their minds
to a higher purpose while governing.98 In addition, the majority rejected Bormuth’s
claim that Jackson County’s prayer practice was coercive, stating that “polite
requests by [lawmakers] to stand for invocations do not coerce prayer.”99 Similarly,
incidents where the commissioners spoke negatively about Bormuth were not related
to his religious beliefs, but were in response to Bormuth’s hostility towards them.100
Using the “nitwit” clip and other video evidence, the dissent argued that the
prayer practice was coercive because Bormuth was singled out for opprobrium,101
but claimed that even without the video evidence, the practice was a violation of the
Establishment Clause.102 In doing so, the dissent invoked many of the same factors
used by the majority in Lund.103 Finally, the dissent pointed out what it considered
to be a particularly troubling suggestion by the majority: that if the people of Jackson
County want a more diverse prayer practice, they can elect commissioners of
different faiths.104 This idea suggests that it would be permissible for prayer and
religion to become campaign issues, which is a scenario that the Bill of Rights was
adopted to prevent.105

97

Id. at 511 (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 588 (2014) (plurality
opinion)).
98
Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 511 (citing Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 587 (plurality
opinion)).
99
Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 517 (citing Am. Humanist Ass’n v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521,
526 (5th Cir. 2017)).
100
Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 518 (explaining that the commissioners reacted poorly to the
litigious way in which Bormuth expressed himself, but not to his personal religious beliefs).
Peter Bormuth does have a history of suing Jackson City and County and has been threatened
with sanctions by one federal judge. Bormuth v. City of Jackson, No. 12-11235, 2013 WL
1944574, at *2 (E.D. Mich. May 9, 2013); see also Court Cases, PETER BORMUTH,
http://peterbormuth.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/7TCV-2TFV].
101
Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 539–42 (Moore, J., dissenting).
102
Id. at 537.
103
Id. at 537–39 (“Legislator-led prayer at the local level falls far afield of the historical
tradition upheld in Marsh and Town of Greece. The setting—a local government meeting
with constituent petitioners in the audience—amplifies the importance of the identity of the
prayer giver in our analysis, and heightens the risks of coercion . . . .”).
104
Id. at 539.
105
Id.; see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (“The
very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s right to life, liberty, and
property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections.”).
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C. The Supreme Court’s Denial of Certiorari in Rowan County v. Lund – 2018
Both Rowan County and Peter Bormuth appealed these rulings.106 On June 28,
2018, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in both cases.107
Interestingly, Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch, dissented
from the Court’s denial of certiorari in Lund and wrote an opinion.108 Stating that
the Fourth Circuit’s analysis “failed to appreciate the long history of legislator-led
prayer” in the United States, Justice Thomas acknowledged that he would have
granted Rowan County’s petition for certiorari and ruled in its favor.109 Justice
Thomas brought up the example of the South Carolina Provincial Congress (also
mentioned by the dissenters in Lund) and the fact that “[s]everal States, including
West Virginia and Illinois, opened their constitutional conventions with prayers led
by convention members instead of chaplains.”110 Apparently based only on these
examples, Justice Thomas declared that “[f]or as long as this country has had
legislative prayer, legislators have led it.”111
IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH ANALYZING LEGISLATOR-LED PRAYER
UNDER THE MARSH AND TOWN OF GREECE STANDARDS
The majority in Bormuth and the dissenters in Lund analyzed legislator-led
prayer as if it were the same thing as the clergy-led prayer practices upheld in Marsh
and Town of Greece.112 One group of dissenters in Lund even stated that “[t]he
majority’s pro forma distinction of Town of Greece can only be driven by its desire
to reach a different end, because the nature of Rowan County’s prayer practice
is . . . virtually indistinguishable from the practice upheld by the Supreme Court in
Town of Greece.”113 Despite the categorical nature of this assertion, some key
differences between legislator-led and clergy-led prayer and the potential effects of
each are easily recognizable. For one, legislator-led prayer poses a much greater
threat to the democratic process than clergy-led prayer. The most obvious difference,
the identity of the prayer-giver, is hugely important, because history (the tool used
by the Supreme Court to evaluate legislative prayer cases114) does not support the
practice of legislator-led prayer. These differences will be evaluated below.
106
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Rowan Cty. v. Lund, 138 S. Ct. 2564 (2018) (No.
17-565); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 138 S. Ct. 2708
(2018) (No. 17-7220).
107
Rowan Cty. v. Lund, 138 S. Ct. 2564, 2564 (2018) (denying cert.); Bormuth v. Cty.
of Jackson, 138 S. Ct. 2708, 2708 (2018) (denying cert.).
108
Rowan Cty. v. Lund, 138 S. Ct. 2564, 2564 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
109
Id. at 2565–66.
110
Id. at 2566.
111
Id.
112
Lund, 863 F.3d at 298–99; see Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 509.
113
Lund, 863 F.3d at 299.
114
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576–77 (2014).
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A. Historical Tradition Does Not Support Legislator-Led Prayer
The Supreme Court has determined that “[a]ny test the Court adopts must
acknowledge a practice that was accepted by the Framers and has withstood the
critical scrutiny of time and political change.”115 With this acknowledgement, courts
must “determine whether the prayer practice [at issue] fits within the tradition long
followed in Congress and the state legislatures.”116 Noting that the “[First] Congress
authorized the appointment of paid chaplains” only three days before they agreed on
the final language of the Bill of Rights,117 the Marsh majority relied heavily on the
premise that the Framers of the First Amendment would not have forbidden
legislative prayer when they had just declared the practice acceptable. 118 This
argument is compelling with respect to clergy-led prayer, but the Lund dissent and
Bormuth majority misused this analysis and attempted to “shoehorn the legislatorled prayer . . . issue” into the tradition started by the First Congress.119 The following
sections will outline the prayer practices used in the Constitutional Convention and
during the meetings of the First Congress to show that legislator-led prayer is not
supported by the historical tradition relied upon in Marsh.
1. The Constitutional Convention
The Establishment Clause was not drafted at the Constitutional Convention,120
but because many of the delegates at the Convention eventually served on the First
Congress121 it is useful to analyze their attitudes about legislative prayer.122 There is
no record of any prayers being offered at the Constitutional Convention.123 On June
28, 1787, a little over one month after the Convention started, Benjamin Franklin
lamented that the Convention had made very little progress and suggested that
115

Id. at 577.
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Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788 (1983).
118
Id. at 790. But see Michael Bhargava, The First Congress and the Supreme Court’s
Use of History, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1745, 1762 (2006) (noting that this assumption may not hold
up because many of the actions of the First Congress “may have resulted from political
compromises or expedients that even many Framers believed to be unconstitutional”).
119
Lund v. Rowan Cty., 863 F.3d 268, 294 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Motz, J.,
concurring).
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William French Smith, Some Observations on the Establishment Clause, 11 PEPP.
L. REV. 457, 458–59 (1984) (noting that James Madison, a member of the First Congress,
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after some adjustments by other members of the First Congress).
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Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790 (citing Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 297
(1888)).
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See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57 (1884). But see
Bhargava, supra note 118, at 1766 (stating that the Framers of the Constitution only
constituted a substantial minority of the members of the First Congress).
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“henceforth prayers imploring the assistance of Heaven, and its blessings on our
deliberations, be held in this Assembly every morning before we proceed to
business, and that one or more of the Clergy of this City be requested to officiate in
that service.”124 The motion was opposed by Alexander Hamilton and others, and it
failed to pass.125 It is somewhat unclear why Hamilton and others were unwilling to
allow a prayer practice, but there is some evidence that delegates were worried that
starting the practice so late into the Convention could “lead the public to believe that
embarrassments and dissensions within the convention” had given rise to Franklin’s
motion.126 It is, however, extremely doubtful that this was the real reason for the
opposition. “One of the earliest rules established by the Convention restrained the
members from any disclosure whatever of its proceedings . . . .”127 There is evidence
that this was a very significant rule and that it was adhered to rigidly.128 Because of
this, it is somewhat unlikely that Hamilton and others were actually worried about
what the public might perceive. This assertion is bolstered by the fact that Hugh
Williamson, a delegate from North Carolina, observed that the true cause of the lack
of prayer was that “[t]he Convention had no funds” to pay a member of the local
clergy.129
The records available from the Convention show that no delegates were
opposed to the prayer practice itself, they were merely concerned about appearances
or an inability to get a chaplain.130 Indeed, Benjamin Franklin thought that
“imploring the assistance of Heaven, and its blessings” was essential because
without the “concurring aid [of God]” the delegates would not succeed in crafting
the new government.131 Franklin and others clearly thought that prayers were
extremely important, and reading Franklin’s passionate speech advocating for prayer
232 years later, it is logical to ask, why didn’t one of the Framers simply start their
meetings with a prayer? It seems that the Framers were more willing to accept going
without an opening prayer than having a delegate to the Convention offer one.
Perhaps, even at this early stage in the founding of our country, they recognized the
importance of a principle later articulated by Justice Brennan: that essentially
124

THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 10, at 450–52.
Id. at 452.
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Letter from James Madison to James Monroe, June 10, 1787,
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religious issues should remain, to some degree, separate from government activity
and “not become the occasion for battle in the political arena.”132 In short, there is
strong evidence from the time of the Framers to suggest that the identity of a prayergiver in governmental proceedings is relevant to the legislative prayer analysis.
2. The First Congress
As noted above, a core assumption relied upon by the Supreme Court in its
legislative prayer decisions is that, because the “First Congress provided for the
appointment of chaplains only days after approving language for the First
Amendment, . . . the Framers considered legislative prayer a benign
acknowledgement of religion’s role in society.”133 It must first be expressed that,
though useful in some circumstances, looking to the actions of the First Congress is
a very problematic tool of constitutional interpretation.134 First, because many
actions of the First Congress may have been the result of political compromises,135
it is possible that the results of some of these decisions “may have been one[s] that
a majority of [the] members of Congress considered unconstitutional.”136 A 1789
debate on the power of the President to remove officers illustrates this point. In the
debate,
James Madison led a group, call it A, who believed that the Constitution
granted removal power to the President alone. He had two groups of
opponents: B, who thought that Congress, rather than the Constitution,
determined the issue, and C, who thought that the Constitution provided
for joint power of removal shared by the executive branch and the Senate
. . . . Madison engineered two votes on amendments. One vote divided his
two opponent groups one way (A was joined by B and opposed by C); the
second vote divided them the other way (A was joined by C and opposed
by B). The result was that Madison’s group, A, was the only faction to get
its way both times, so its view prevailed–even though there was no
majority that supported both amendments proposed by Madison. The
combined effect of the amendments was to create a congressional
“decision” suggesting that, as a constitutional matter, the President has the
sole power to remove executive officials.137
In a 1926 decision, a majority of the Supreme Court used Congress’ 1789
decision to show “that it was ‘very clear from this history’ that the Framers believed
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the President held the sole power to remove officers . . . .”138 This conclusion is
simply not supported by what actually happened in the vote.139
Using the actions of the First Congress to inform present-day judicial decisions
becomes even more difficult when there is little information about the debates and
votes on bills.140 This is undoubtedly the case with the legislative prayer debate in
the First Congress.141 No complete record of the vote for the creation of chaplaincies
has survived,142 making it difficult to know whether there was overwhelming support
for the proposition or if it was the result of a compromise like the 1789 removal
power debate. There is, however, evidence of at least some strong dissent to the
creation of congressional chaplaincies in the First Congress.143 Thomas Paine, who
was not even living in the United States when the vote was held,144 received three
votes to be chaplain.145 Because Paine was not available to fill the post and was a
well-known critic of organized religion, it seems clear that these were votes cast in
protest of the chaplaincies.146
Even assuming that acts of the First Congress were believed to be constitutional
by members of that group and not merely the result of political compromises, it does
not necessarily follow that “[those actions] are presumptively consistent with the
Bill of Rights . . . .”147 The classic example supporting this proposition is the passage
of the Judiciary Act of 1789. When the First Congress voted on the Act, none of the
original Framers or any other member expressed concerns that any portion of it was
unconstitutional.148 Famously, the Supreme Court found the Judiciary Act
unconstitutional because it attempted to expand the Court’s original jurisdiction
beyond what was allowed under Article III of the Constitution.149 “Thus, while the
views of those closest to the process that led to and followed the framing of the
Constitution may provide insight into its meaning, the views of [the First] Congress
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Id. (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 60 (1926)).
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or of its individual members cannot provide irrebuttable evidence of the ‘meaning’
of the Constitution.”150
Even if the premise that the acts of the First Congress should be given great
weight is accepted, the actions of the First Congress do not support legislator-led
prayer, especially not in the way it is more recently presented in Lund and
Bormuth.151 A search of the records of the First Congress does not show a single
example of legislator-led prayer, showing that “[t]he Framers apparently relied
exclusively on chaplain-led prayer to solemnize their proceedings.”152 As stressed
by the majority in Marsh, the actions of Congress at this early moment in the history
of the United States surely reveal what the Framers intended the Establishment
Clause to mean.153 Thus, it is telling not only that they did not give opening
invocations themselves, but also that they imposed limits on clergy-led prayer to
ensure that the practice remained religiously neutral.154 The House and Senate
formed committees to “take under consideration the manner of electing
chaplains.”155 It was agreed a week later “[t]hat two chaplains of different
denominations, be appointed to Congress for the present session, the Senate appoint
one, and give notice thereof to the House of Representatives, who shall, thereupon,
appoint the other; which chaplains shall commence their services in the Houses that
appoint them, but shall interchange weekly.”156 The care taken by the Framers on
this issue reflects their concern with avoiding even a thought that the government
favored a single religion.157 There is no other coherent reason why the First Congress
would have “bound themselves to select chaplains of different denominations and to
rotate the chaplains so often.”158
The local governments in Lund and Bormuth took no such precautions and
risked alienating county residents by showing favoritism to Christianity.159 In
Jackson County, the commissioners not only endorsed a specific religion, but made
an intentional decision to control the content of prayers at board meetings by not
allowing anyone other than a board member to pray.160 At one board meeting, a
Jackson County Commissioner speculated about what might occur if any county
resident could lead an opening prayer:
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We all know that any one . . . could go online and become an ordained
minister in about ten minutes. Um, so if somebody from the public wants
to come before us and say that they are an ordained minister we are going
to have to allow them as well . . . . I think we are opening a Pandora’s Box
here because you are going to get members of the public who are going to
come up at public comment and we are going to create a lot of problems
here when certain people come up here and say things that they are not
going to like.161
These comments show that the board was limiting who could give prayers to
control the content of invocations.162 To say, as did the Sixth Circuit en banc, that
such a prayer practice comports with the actions of the First Congress ignores the
care taken by the Framers to avoid even the appearance of a sectarian preference. In
brief, the prayer practices in Lund and Bormuth are completely different from what
was authorized by the First Congress. Because of this, prayer practices like these
can be “cast aside” without disrupting more than “two centuries of national
practice.”163
3. Specific Historical Examples of Legislator-Led Prayer
As noted by The Bormuth majority, the Lund dissent, and Justice Thomas in his
dissent from the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Lund, there is some
historical evidence of legislator-led prayer in the United States.164 In 1776,
“Reverend Mr. Turquand,” a member of the South Carolina Provincial Congress,
performed “divine service” prior to some sessions of the Congress.165 As Justice
Thomas acknowledges, these instances of legislator-led prayer were “prior to
Independence” and certainly long before the drafting and adoption of the First
Amendment’s Establishment Clause.166 Using a few references to “divine service”167
being offered by one legislator in one state prior to the signing of the United States
Constitution or the adoption of the Bill of Rights seems like an attempt by Justice
Thomas and the en banc Sixth Circuit to find historical support that simply is not
there.
161
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The other evidence cited by Justice Thomas, that West Virginia and Illinois
started their state constitutional conventions with invocations led by legislators, is
also not persuasive evidence to back up his claim that “[f]or as long as this country
has had legislative prayer, legislators have led it.”168 The Constitutional Convention
for the State of Illinois took place in 1818169 and the West Virginia Convention did
not begin until November 1861.170 The inquiry of courts in legislative prayer cases
must focus on “whether the prayer practice . . . fits within the tradition long followed
in Congress and the state legislatures.”171 Practices that date back to the time of the
Framers have unique importance within this inquiry.172 As outlined above,
legislator-led prayer is not a part of the “tradition long followed in Congress . . . .”173
The states also do not have a long tradition of legislator-led prayer.174
Though legislator-led prayer has recently become prevalent in many states,175
Justice Thomas was only able to point to two concrete examples of states (West
Virginia and Illinois) that have a long history of legislator-led prayer.176 Even these
examples, the best historical evidence that can be gathered by proponents of
legislator-led prayer, do not come close to dating back to the time of the Founding
Fathers. As colorfully noted by a concurring Judge in Lund, these historical instances
of legislator-led prayer are “very thin gruel” when compared to the historical
tradition of clergy-led prayer discussed in Marsh and Town of Greece and are
“certainly no substitute for the Framers’ own practice and understandings.”177
B. Prayer Practices Similar to Those Evaluated in Lund and Bormuth Pose
a Greater Threat to the Democratic Process than Clergy-Led Prayer
The Lund majority reasoned that “[l]egislator-led prayer is not inherently
unconstitutional,”178 but simply that, as the above discussion of history indicates,
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“the identity of the prayer-giver is relevant to the constitutional inquiry.”179 Because
the historical tradition relied upon in Marsh and Town of Greece cannot support
legislator-led prayer, other tools must be used to evaluate such prayer practices.180
As a separate prong of analysis, courts in legislative prayer cases must conduct a
“fact-sensitive” review of “the setting in which the prayer arises and the audience to
whom it is directed.”181 Within this fact-sensitive inquiry, the content of prayers is
often not of concern to judges,182 but the Establishment Clause does constrain the
content of even clergy-led prayers to some extent.183 The Establishment Clause does
not allow prayers that “denigrate nonbelievers or religious minorities, threaten
damnation, preach conversion, proselytize, or advance or disparage a particular
faith.184 Thus, legislative prayers that include any of the listed characteristics can
violate the Establishment Clause even if they are clergy-led.185 In addition, it is a
core principle of the First Amendment that governments may not coerce citizens “to
support or participate in any religion or its exercise.”186 The following sections will
examine these issues to show that prayer practices like those used in Lund and
Bormuth are not constitutionally permissible, and that legislator-led prayer in
general creates greater potential for Establishment Clause problems.
1. The Setting of Legislative Prayer and Coercion
Distinct from Marsh, which dealt with clergy-led prayer in a state legislature,
the facts of Lund and Bormuth involve legislator-led prayers in local town
meetings.187 Town of Greece made clear that, at least in the context of clergy-led
prayer, it makes no constitutional difference whether the prayers are offered in a
state legislature or a local town board meeting.188 In her dissent, Justice Kagan
sharply criticized this view.189 Justice Kagan would have distinguished the Marsh
practice of prayers in a state legislature directed primarily at the lawmakers from
what occurred in Town of Greece.190 She noted that in Marsh, the prayers were an
internal act for the benefit the lawmakers, a practice completely different from Town
of Greece where “[a] chaplain face[d] the Town’s residents—with the Board

179
180

Id.
See id. at 279–81; see also Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 581–83

(2014).

181

Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 587 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 581 (majority opinion).
183
Id. at 582–83.
184
Id. at 583; see also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1983).
185
See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 582–83.
186
Id. at 586 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
187
Lund v. Rowan Cty., 863 F.3d 268, 271–73 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Bormuth v.
Cty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 497–98 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
188
See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 575–76.
189
Id. at 632–34 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
190
Id.
182

728

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

watching from on high—and call[ed] on them to pray together.”191 Justice Kagan
and three other members of the Supreme Court found legislative prayer in the
“highly intimate” setting of a town meeting problematic even when clergy-led.192
What occurred in Lund and Bormuth is even more troubling. First, it seems
clear that the prayers offered in Rowan and Jackson county town meetings were not
solely for the benefit of lawmakers.193 The Bormuth majority’s statement that
“[l]egislative prayer exists ‘largely to accommodate the spiritual needs of lawmakers
and connect them to a tradition dating back to the time of the Framers’”194 simply
does not reflect the way prayer was being used in these counties. Video evidence
from Jackson County meetings shows that the town commissioners offered prayers
at every single board meeting “except the one that no members of the public
attended.”195 Second, legislator-led prayer as it was practiced in Lund and Bormuth
can alienate citizens from the local democratic process.196 Citizens attend local
government meetings to “participate in democracy” and to petition the town’s
elected representatives for rights and benefits.197 In Lund, these citizen petitions
occurred shortly after the invocation given by a board member.198 Non-Christian
citizens attending a town meeting with the hopes of addressing meaningful local
issues may face the choice of participating in a prayer practice they do not believe
in or offending the very government leader that they will soon be attempting to
persuade.199
Addressing the specific situation of town board meetings, Justice Kennedy’s
opinion in Town of Greece envisioned certain hypothetical situations that would
make a town’s prayer practice coercive.200 After determining that the prayer practice
in Town of Greece was not coercive, Justice Kennedy explained that “[t]he analysis
would be different if town board members directed the public to participate in the
prayers, singled out dissidents for opprobrium, or indicated that their decisions
might be influenced by a person’s acquiescence in the prayer opportunity.”201 These
issues might have been hypothetical in Town of Greece, but they became reality for
the citizens involved in Lund and Bormuth. The first time that Peter Bormuth raised
his concerns about legislator-led prayer in a board meeting, a commissioner “made
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a disgusted face” at him and “turned his chair around, refusing to listen.”202 On a
separate occasion, a board member called Bormuth a “nitwit” for voicing objection
the town prayer practice.203 In Lund, a citizen that questioned the board’s prayer
practice was “booed and jeered by her fellow citizens.”204
As already noted, the town board members in both of these cases were giving
the prayers and in charge of directing the public to participate.205 The Fourth Circuit
weighed these factors appropriately in holding that “Rowan County’s prayer practice
violated the Establishment Clause.”206 The Sixth Circuit, dealing with government
conduct that was arguably more coercive and egregious, explained it away by stating
that the board members were not expressing antagonism for Bormuth’s religious
beliefs, but simply reacting to Bormuth’s negative attitude toward them.207 In sum,
in addition to falling outside of the historical tradition delineated in Marsh, the
insults, heckling, and government direction over prayer present in Lund and
Bormuth coerced and intimidated citizens in violation of the principles outlined in
Town of Greece. Compounding these concerns, the commissioners in both these
cases “maintained exclusive and complete control over the content of the prayers”208
by prohibiting anyone other than town board members from offering invocations.209
2. The Content of Prayers
“If members of a legislative body recite[] one religion’s creed month after
month, year after year, allowing no opportunity for members of any other religion
to lead a prayer, a reasonable observer c[an] only conclude that the legislative body
prefer[s] that religion over all others.”210 According to the plaintiffs in Lund, the
almost exclusively Christian prayers given by Rowan County Commissioners “sent
a message that the County and Board favor[ed] Christians . . . .”211 Courts analyzing
these issues often downplay the effect of prayer and religious practices on listeners

202

Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 525 (Moore, J., dissenting).
Cty. of Jackson, supra note 91, at 43:29–43:40.
204
Lund v. Rowan Cty., 863 F.3d 268, 288 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
205
Id. at 272 (“After calling the meeting to order, the chairperson asks everyone in
attendance—commissioners and constituents alike—to stand up. All five Board members
rise and bow their heads, along with most of the attendees. A commissioner then asks the
community to join him in worship, using phrases such as . . . ‘Please pray with me.’”);
Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 498 (“Following a call to order, the Board’s Chairman typically
requests Commissioners and the public alike to . . . ‘Please bow your heads and let us
pray’. . . .”).
206
Lund, 863 F.3d at 275.
207
Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 518.
208
Lund, 863 F.3d at 274; see also Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 538 (Moore, J., dissenting).
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and participants.212 Politically conscious citizens are not being “hypersensitive”213
for objecting to years of exclusively Christian prayers, but merely expressing a core
part of who they are.214 Contrary to the Town of Greece majority view, the content
of prayers does matter. Phrases like “the saving sacrifice of Jesus Christ on the cross,
[and] . . . the plan of redemption that is fulfilled in Jesus Christ”215 are “statements
of profound belief and deep meaning” to the prayer-giver.216
Maintaining that the content of prayers in government meetings plays only a
minor role in the constitutional analysis trivializes the beliefs of devout religious
people who truly believe that they are communicating with a divine being. To
prayer-givers in these instances, the content of individual prayers is of supreme
importance,217 but listeners are simply expected to deal with whatever comes, even
when prayers are clearly advocating that others in the community take up a particular
faith.218 This can cause citizens to feel excluded from their communities and the
local political process.219 In brief, though the content of legislative prayers is not
dispositive,220 it is much more important where government leaders are the only
prayer-givers and prayers are used to advance a particular faith.
V. OPTIONS FOR RESOLVING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Many cities and counties around the United States rely on legislator-led prayer
because it is convenient and less expensive than retaining a full-time chaplain,221 and
two en banc circuit courts have reached opposite conclusions on the issues discussed
above.222 Both Rowan County and Peter Bormuth appealed these rulings,223 but
despite the direct conflict between the rulings of the two circuits, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari in both cases in June 2018.224 Because of this denial of certiorari
212
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“[s]tate and local lawmakers can lead prayers in Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, and
Michigan, but not in South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, or West
Virginia.”225 A Supreme Court ruling will eventually be necessary to provide state
and local officials with guidance on this issue,226 but until the Court steps in to
resolve the conflict, federal courts in other circuits have a variety of avenues
available for dealing with challenges to legislator-led prayer practices.
A. Analysis Using the Marsh and Town of Greece Frameworks
The most likely course of action for federal courts outside of the Fourth and
Sixth Circuits in legislator-led prayer challenges would be rulings using the analysis
of Marsh and Town of Greece. Even if courts were to determine that the identity of
the prayer-giver is not dispositive to the constitutional equation, prayer practices like
those in Lund and Bormuth should still be considered unconstitutional because they
coerce participation by all present and actively promote the practice and spread of
Christianity.227 More far-reaching rulings would track the Fourth Circuit’s analysis,
recognizing the clear differences between legislator-led and clergy-led prayer
practices, and hold legislator-led prayer practices like those in Lund and Bormuth to
be violations of the Establishment Clause. The Town of Greece majority opinion
would allow for this type of ruling.228 It noted that the main issue in legislative prayer
cases is to determine whether the prayer practice “fits within the tradition long
followed in Congress and the state legislatures.”229
Evidence of long-standing tradition is part of this analysis, but key to the inquiry
is whether the tradition dates back to the time of the Framers. 230 If other federal
courts recognize a meaningful difference between legislator-led and clergy-led
prayers coupled with findings of coercion or proselytizing, the inquiry would almost
certainly end there, and practices like those used in Rowan and Jackson counties
would be held unconstitutional under Town of Greece.231 If, on the other hand, courts
are presented with situations where the practice is not coercive or are unwilling to
recognize the relevance of “subtle coercive pressures” to the legislative prayer
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analysis,232 it is plausible that they would turn to a traditional Establishment Clause
test to resolve the issue.
B. Applying the Lemon Test to Legislator-Led Prayer
It may seem unlikely that lower federal courts would use the Lemon test for a
legislative prayer case in the future, but it is not out of the question. Marsh “carv[ed]
out an exception” to the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence by
not subjecting it to any of the formal tests in use at the time.233 The Marsh Court
found those tests unnecessary because government bodies dating back to the First
Congress have started meetings with clergy-led prayer, assuring that the practice is
compatible with the Establishment Clause.234 A historical tradition analysis has been
used by the Supreme Court in other Establishment Clause cases, but only when
dealing with passive government displays that were supported by historical
tradition.235
Contrary to the assertion of the Bormuth majority, applying the Lemon test to
the issue of legislator-led prayer would not be “rewriting thirty-plus years of
Supreme Court jurisprudence,”236 because Marsh and Town of Greece were
addressing a completely different issue than the Fourth and Sixth Circuits.237 History
should be used to analyze legislative prayer when the practice actually has a history
that dates back to the time of the Framers. Though the Lemon test has not been
applied with rigid consistency by federal courts,238 it is still recognized as a key part
of the analysis in many Establishment Clause cases.239
Under the Lemon test, “a governmental practice violates the Establishment
Clause if it (1) lacks a legitimate secular purpose; (2) has the primary effect of
232
This might happen if, for example, a lower federal court were to accept Justice
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concurring).
233
Id. at 575 (majority opinion).
234
Id.; see also Marsh, 463 U.S. at 788 (“[C]learly the men who wrote the First
Amendment Religion Clause did not view paid legislative chaplains . . . as a violation of that
Amendment . . . .”).
235
See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (using history to analyze whether
a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of a state capitol created an Establishment
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advancing or inhibiting religion; or (3) fosters an excessive entanglement with
religion.”240 In his dissent in Marsh, Justice Brennan applied Lemon to the Nebraska
legislature’s prayer practice and determined that it violated all three elements.241 It
was “self-evident” to him that the purpose of legislative prayer was not secular, but
religious.242 It is not clear whether this assertion would hold up in all legislative
prayer cases today, because the Supreme Court stated in Town of Greece that
legislative prayer exists “largely to accommodate the spiritual needs of lawmakers
and connect them to a tradition dating to the time of the Framers.”243 Whether this
purpose would be considered secular is unclear, but when legislative prayers are not
for the benefit of lawmakers at all, the analysis is easier.
The prayers in Lund and Bormuth were at least partly directed at the members
of the public that were present at town meetings.244 In Bormuth, the board of
commissioners prayed at every meeting over a two-year span except the one where
no members of the public were present, undermining the argument that legislatorled prayer is primarily for the benefit of lawmakers.245 Justice Brennan also observed
that the primary effect of legislative prayer is advancing religion.246 Prayers in
government settings explicitly link religious beliefs to the power of the State, and
even if citizens can choose not to participate, they place coercive pressure on
religious minorities.247 It is important to note that Justice Brennan was referencing
clergy-led prayer in his dissent, but his concerns about coercion and linking religion
to the state are magnified when the prayer-giver is an elected government official
facing constituent citizens.
Finally, legislative prayer generally, and certainly legislator-led prayer as it was
practiced in Lund and Bormuth, “leads to excessive entanglement between the State
and religion.”248 When a town board opens monthly meetings with prayers given by
a board member, “there is no distinction between the government and the prayer
giver: they are one and the same.”249 In addition, legislator-led prayer fosters
government entanglement with religion because it creates a risk of religious beliefs
becoming a campaign issue in elections.250 In sum, because historical tradition does
240
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not support legislator-led prayer, federal courts hearing legislator-led prayer
challenges could apply the Lemon test and hold that prayer practices similar to those
in Lund and Bormuth violate the Establishment Clause.
VI. CONCLUSION
In a time of ever-increasing division along political and religious lines,251
Justice Kagan’s dissenting remarks in Town of Greece about what the Establishment
Clause should guarantee ring true: “[w]hen the citizens of this country approach their
government, they do so only as Americans, not as members of one faith or another.
And that means that even in a partly legislative body, they should not confront
government-sponsored worship that divides them along religious lines.”252
Legislator-led prayer as it was practiced in Lund and Bormuth impermissibly leads
to treatment of citizens solely as members of faiths in a way that clergy-led prayer
does not. Because the historical tradition relied on in Marsh and Town of Greece
cannot save legislator-led prayer practices where the legislators reserve prayer
opportunities exclusively for themselves, federal courts should adopt the view taken
in Lund and recognize that the identity of the prayer-givers in legislative meetings
is relevant to the legislative prayer analysis.
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